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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK M. WELLS, Assignee, 
Statutory Assignment for the 
Benefit of Creditors of Financial 
Service Company, Inc., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; and FIRST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, a Nat-
ional Association, 
Defendants and Appellant, 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah banking corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
GOLDEN STETTLER, an individual, 
LYNN TOOLSON, an individual, 
ALMA DITTMER, an individual, 
H. M. NIELSON, an individual, 
and ELMER GIBSON, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 15750 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Frank M. Wells, Assignee, 
Statutory Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors of Financial 
Service Company, Inc., claiming damages in exc;.:_~3-of -~9?, _ _9.0_Q_~OO 
against Walker Bank & Trust Company, the appellant herein, and 
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another bank, upon which claim appellant asserts that if there 
--~- --
be any damage to the plaintiff below for which appellant may 
be responsible then the third party defendants, being the 
former trustees of the Cache Valley Syndicate Trust (CVST), 
and the respondents herein (CVST being the successor to Fin-
ancial Service Company, Inc.), are responsible to appellant 
based upon the alleged wrongdoing of an employee of the 
respondents done in the course of his employment and the 
alleged negligence of respondents in hiring, retaining and 
supervising that employee. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court, the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge, 
sitting under designation of the Honorable VeNoy Christoffer-
son, granted a motion to dismiss submitted by respondents 
------------ -
dismissing the Third-Party Complaint of appellant against 
--------··--
respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the Order of 
the lower court dismissing appellant's Third-Party Complaint 
and remand the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action, being one on which a third party complaint 
has been filed, relies upon the alle~ations of the plaintiff 
below as well as the respondent herein. The alle_gat~o_i:_s_ 
ofthe-phl~tiff below in his Complaint are accepted as true 
-2-
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for the purposes of this appeal even though they will be con-
tested at time of trial. Those allegations of the Complaint 
were incorporated by reference into the Third-Party Complaint 
and, thereby, add to the factual basis of this appeal. 
Frank M. Wells, the plaintiff below, is the statutory 
assignee for the benefit of creditors for Financial Service 
Company, Inc., a defunct Utah corporation, and its common 
law assignee for the benefit '?_f __ creditors_, Cache Valley Syn-
dicate Trust, hereinafter referred to as "CVST". (R. l) 
Plaintiff brought an action against Walker Bank & Trust Corn-
pany, the appellant herein, and First Security Bank of Utah (R.l) 
based upon various allegations that those banks had been gross-
.·~·----·----~~------·-
ly negligent or merely negligent and dealt with various checks 
. ·- . ... . -·- ---------
with knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duties or not in good 
~----,,.~----~--~ ""'··--- -~-
faith. (R.2) The specific factual allegations upon which 
plaintiff bases his action against appellant and First Securi-
ty Bank are: 
(1) that appellant paid out over chec~s ()~ _ _91ST ___ n~;t 
drawn on appellant which bore unauthorized altera-
tions of the name of the payee or the amount of 
the checks, or both (R.2, 4)~ 
(2) that appellant converted or allowed Elmer G. Erick-
son to convert proceeds of some checks of CVST __ z::ot 
drawn on appellant despite a special deposi~ ~~re 
of those checks (R.3); 
-3-
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(3) that appellant paid out on various checks payable 
to CVST without adequate execution of the checks 
(R.3); 
(4) that appellant paid out on checks payable to CVST 
bearing unauthorized endorsements. (R.4); 
During that period of time that the allegations referred 
to above were supposed to be occurring Financial Service 
Company, Inc., was being operated as Cache Valley Syndicate 
Trust (R.l) which was being managed and directed by Golden 
--
Stettler, Lynn Toolson, Alma Dittmer, H. M. Nielson, and 
Elmer Gibson, the respondents herein, acting as trustees of 
CVST. (R.43) Elmer G. Erickson was employed as an agent or 
servant of respondents to help respondents in their manage-
ment of the trust. (R.45) While so employed and in the scope 
of his employment, Elmer G. Erickson perpetrated those acts 
referred to above of making unauthorized alterations to checks, 
conversion of special deposits, submitting checks for payment 
without adequate execution, and submitting for payment checks 
be'a-r:lng unauthorized endorsements which endorsements were 
made by said Elmer G. Erickson. (R.45) 
While Elmer G. Erickson was employed by respondents, 
respondents knew or should have known that Elmer G. Erickson 
had been doing those wrongful actions with the checks and 
accounts of CVST as referred to above, yet respondents hired 
and continued to employ Mr. Erickson. (R.46) Respondents 
also failed to adequately supervise and care for Elmer G. 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Erickson while he was in the employ of respondents while at 
the same time placing Mr. Erickson in a position that required 
his supervision as he aided the management of CVST. (R.l, 46) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
ALL ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANT WALKER BANK 
ARE TO BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVOR-
ABLE TO IT. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM AGAINST RE-
SPONDENTS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANT-
ED BASED UPON A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLE-
GATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENTLY HIRED 
AND RETAINED AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY 
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLE-
GATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ADEQUATE-
LY SUPERVISE AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY 
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK. 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANT WALKER 
BANK ARE TO BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO IT. 
The standard to be applied in reviewing the sufficiency 
of any attempt to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted has been clearly stated by this Court and others. 
The matters alleged by the party to whom a motion to dismiss 
under 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
lodged are entitled to be viewed and considered by the court 
with all the inferences fairly arising therefrom in a light 
most favorable to that party. This Court has previously 
stated in Young v. Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 
1099 (1958), that in reviewing the granting of a motion for 
sununary judgment 
• the party against whom the judgment 
has been granted is entitled to have all 
the facts presented and all the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Id. at 1100. 
? 
-
See also, Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967). 
The same rule is applied to Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss. 
In reviewing a case involving a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss 
this Court wrote: 
A complaint does not fail to state a 
claim unless it appears to a certainty 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to 
no relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claim. 
Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Trans. 
Service, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 
605, 607 (1970). 
-7-
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To this standard the pleading of appellant must be compared. 
Under the criterion as established by this Court all 
the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint of appellant 
are to be deemed true and are to be read in a light most 
favorable to appellant. Consequently, those facts as stated 
in the Statement of Facts herein, being merely a rescitation 
of the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint which incor-
porated by reference the allegations of the Complaint are 
to be accepted as true by this Court and given all infer-
ences favorable to the position of appellant herein. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM AGAINST 
RESPONDENTS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE 
GRANTED BASED UPON A RESPONDEAT SUPER-
IOR THEORY. 
Appellant has alleged in its Third-Party Complaint that 
whatever loss that may have been sustained by Frank M. Wells, 
Trustee, the plaintiff below, for which appellant may be 
legally responsible to plaintiff, was a result of the tort-
ious actions of one Elmer G. Erickson, namely, the forging 
of endorsements, altering of instruments and passing on of 
instruments known to be incompletely executed. All such 
actions of Elmer G. Erickson causing such damage were 
alleged by appellant to have been done in the scope and 
course of the employment of Elmer G. Erickson as an agent 
or servant of respondents while respondents were trustees 
of Cache Valley Syndicate Trust. 
-8-
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The doctrine of respondeat superior has long recog-
nized that the employer is vicariously liable, notwith-
standing complete lack of fault on his part, for the tort-
ious conduct of his employees done in the course of the 
employee's employment. Under such circumstances the employer 
is liable for the wrong of the employee just as if the 
employer was the actual wrongdoer. The general rule is 
succinctly set forth in Prosser, Torts, §70 (4th ed. 1971), 
where it reads: 
Once it is determined that the man at 
work is a servant, the master becomes 
subject to vicarious liability for his 
torts. 
* * * * 
his vicarious liability, for con-
duct which is in no way his own, extends 
to any and all tortious conduct of the 
servant which is within the "scope of the 
employment." 
The phrase "scope of the employment" is sometimes sub-
stituted with the phrase "course of the employment.'' Id. 
The Restatement, Second, Agency, §219, reinforces the 
position of Professor Prosser noted above when it states: 
(1) A master is subject to liability for 
the torts of his servants committed while 
acting in the scope of their employment. 
The general authorities are clear as to the standard to be 
applied, the application of which to the fact situation now 
before this Court would dictate the conclusion that appellant 
had stated in its Third-Party Complaint a claim upon which 
relief may be granted. 
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Appellant had alleged that all of respondents are 
trustees of the Cache Valley Syndicate Trust and had em-
ployed Elmer G. Erickson, the alleged tortfeasor, to help 
conduct the affairs of their managing the trust. It has 
been uniformly determined that: 
[a] trustee is liable for the tortious 
acts of an agent or servant performed 
during the course of his employment. 
Bogert, Trusts, §129, (5th ed. 1973). 
See also, Curtis v. Title Guaran~eTrust Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 
612, 40 P.2d 562 (Ct. App. Cal. 1935). The drafters of 
the Restatement, Second, Trusts, §264 provided in Comment b. 
that: 
Under the principle of respondeat superior, 
torts committed by the agents or servants 
of the trustee in the course of the admini-
stration of the trust subject the trustee 
to liability to the same extent as though 
he were not a trustee. The principle of 
respondeat superior is applicable although 
the trustee receives no benefit from the 
trust. 
Appellant is herein petitioning this Court to reverse 
the decision of the lower court and remand the action for 
trial giving appellant the opportunity to prove the facts 
and legal relationships as alleged. The granting of the 
motion to dismiss, we respectfully suggest, was in error. 
That which was pleaded stated a claim for which relief may 
be granted based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
a generally recognized theory upon which liability may be 
grounded. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLE-
GATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENTLY HIRED 
AND RETAINED AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY 
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK. 
Appellant has alleged in its Third-Party Complaint 
that respondents negligently hired Elmer G. Erickson when 
respondents knew or should have known that Elmer G. Erickson 
had been mishandling the affairs of Cache Valley Syndicate 
Trust. The respondents also continued to retain Elmer G. 
Erickson as an employee with that knowledge or charge of 
knowledge. While in the employment of respondents, Elmer G. 
Erickson committed various torts that damaged the plaintiff 
below. Plaintiff below looks to appellant in satisfaction 
of some of those damages. Appellant asserts under the 
circumstances of this case that if it is responsible to the 
plaintiff below that respondents are responsible to it 
because of their negligence. 
The Restatement, Second, Agency §213 addresses the 
theory purported by your appellant when it says: 
A person conducting an activity through 
servants or other agents is subject to 
liability for harm resulting from his 
conduct if he is negligent or reckless: 
* * * * (b) in the employment of improper 
persons or instrumentalities in work in-
volving risk of harm to others; or 
(d) in permitting, or failing to 
prevent, negligent or other torti~us con-
duct by persons, whether or not his ser-
vants or agents, upon premises or with 
instrumentalities under his control. 
-11-
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The official comment of those who drafted the Restatement 
is equally instructive. Restatement, Second, Agency, §213, 
Comment d. reads: 
The principal may be negligent because 
he has reason to know that the servant 
or other agent, because of his qualities, 
is likely to harm others in view of the 
work or instrumentalities entrusted to 
him. 
Therefore, it is prudent to pick one's agents wisely. 
The claims of negligently hiring and retaining an 
employee do not rely upon any vicarious liability but rely 
on the liability that comes to a wrongdoer for his own 
actions or lack of action. The authorities are clear that 
an employer may be held liable for damages caused by the 
tortious activities of its employees, even though not in 
furtherance of the employer's business, if the employer was 
negligent in employing or retaining the employee who com-
mitted the tort. Reinforcing that which has been stated 
herein, the authors of 57 C.J.S., Master and Servant §559, 
have written: 
A master may be liable for injuries in-
flicted on a third person by his servant 
where he was guilty of negligence in se-
lecting a servant incompetent or other-
wise unfit to perform the services for 
which he was employed • • • 
Retaining in employment a servant who 
is, or should be, known to be incompetent, 
habitually negligent, or otherwise unfit, 
is such negligence on the part of the 
master as will render him liable for in-
juries to third persons resulting from 
-12-
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the acts of the incompetent servant, 
whether the master's knowledge of the 
servant's incompetency was actual, or 
direct, or constructive; the master is 
chargeable with knowledge of the incom-
petency of the servant if by the exercise 
of due or reasonable care or diligence he 
could have ascertained such incompetence. 
The allegations of Walker Bank fit neatly into the state-
rnent of the law above. 
This Court has supported the above rule in Stone v. 
Hurst Lumber Company, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 (Utah 1963). 
There the Court accepted as proper the contention that an 
employer may be liable for being "negligent in failing to 
exercise reasonable care for the safety of its customers by 
employing or retaining a person whom it knew, or should have 
known because of habits or temperament, might" injure another 
dealing with that employee. Id. at 911. The courts have, 
therefore, recognized that an individual in the wrong 
position or employment may be a dangerous instrumentality 
to third persons. One ought not to be able to hire another 
to do his bidding with known wrongful tendencies and pro-
pensities without bearing the consequences of the wrongs 
committed when those tendencies and propensities effectuate 
themselves in wrongful action. 
As stated earlier herein, it is not material whether 
or not the actions of the employee was within the scope 
of employment where the action is based upon the negligence 
of the employer in hiring and continuing to employ an 
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incompetent employee. In Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard 
Company, 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964), the Kansas 
Supreme Court was faced with a law situation similar to 
the one now before this Court. In Stricklin the plaintiff 
had alleged that the defendant employees "knew or had know-
ledge" that an employee had played dangerous pranks to 
those properly on the premises of the defendant. The 
plaintiff in that case was the recipient of one of the 
pranks and was injured. In reversing the lower court which 
had dismissed the action against the employer, the Kansas 
Supreme Court wrote: 
The doctrine of respondeat superior is 
not here involved. This is a common law 
action charging the master with actionable 
negligence in retaining an incompetent and 
unfit employee, and it is unnecessary to 
determine whether Burt [the wrongdoing 
employee] was acting within the scope of 
his employment. Id. at 829 (bracketed 
i tern added. ) 
In this matter now before this Court respondent requests a 
similar reversal to that requested and granted in the 
Stricklin case. 
Appellant Walker Bank & Trust Company merely requests 
permission of this Court to have the opportunity to prove 
the substance of its allegations. As has been shown by the 
recitation of the authorities herein, if Walker Bank can 
establish as true the facts as alleged, then Walker Bank 
will be entitled to relief from respondents herein. 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV 
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH 
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE 
ALLEGATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO 
ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE 
ACTIONS MAY BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO 
WALKER BANK. 
Appellant Walker Bank & Trust Company also asserts 
that the court below erred in failing to recognize that 
the Third-Party Complaint stated a claim against respon-
dents upon which relief may be granted based upon a claim 
that respondents failed to adequately supervise the actions 
of one of its employees, namely Elmer G. Erickson, should 
appellant be required to respond in damages to plaintiff. 
The allegations here also are that the respondents knew 
or should have known of the mismanagement of Cache Valley 
Syndicate Trust by Elmer G. Erickson, it being the actions 
of Elmer G. Erickson which give rise to the action of 
plaintiff against appellant for damages. Here again we 
refer to the Restatement, Second, Agency §213 to establish 
the general rule. That section provides: 
A person conducting an activity through 
servants or other agents is subject to 
liability for harm resulting from his 
conduct if he is negligent or reckless: 
* * * * (c) in the supervision of the 
activity; or 
(d) in permitting, or failing to 
prevent, negligent or other torti~us con-
duct by persons, whether or not his ser-
vants or agents,upon premises or with in-
strumentalities under his control. 
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The courts and authorities have recognized that the employer 
must supervise his employees. The dilatory and non-diligent 
employer will not be rewarded for its ignorance of his em-
ployee's actions caused by its failure to supervise that 
employee. Such a result would have no social utility. The 
employer is properly charged with the knowledge of the actions 
of his employees that proper supervision would have disclosed 
and the duty to correct any wrongly performed actions or 
take steps to assure that future wrongful acts are prevented. 
Elmer G. Erickson was also placed or allowed to remain 
in a position wherein the wrongs could have been committed 
merely by virtue of the position held. Elmer G. Erickson 
was directly involved in the management of CVST which pre-
sumably gave him access to all the instrumentalities of 
CVST, including the checks and accounts. The Restatement, 
Second, Agency, §219 provides: 
(2) A master is not subject to liability 
for the torts of his servants acting out-
side the scope of their employment, unless: 
* * * * (d) the servant purported to act or 
speak on behalf of the principal and there 
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he 
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the 
existence of the agency relation. (Emphasis 
Added) 
Without such access the torts of Elmer G. Erickson alleged 
by plaintiff below and appellant could not have occurred. 
Appellant hereby requests this Court to recognize, 
like the authors of the Restatement quoted above, that one. 
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who undertakes an enterprise has a duty to others to do all 
within his power to assure that the enterprise is operated 
in a safe and non-damaging manner especially when that em-
ployee is placed or allowed to remain in a position which 
could aid the commission of the tort. This duty is inde-
pendent of any duty to hire competent employees. Once 
employed the employee should not be left to his own, subject 
to all the monetary temptations to which even strong per-
sons can succumb without some adequate precautions and 
supervision. The allegations of the Third-Party Complaint 
suggest that respondents did fail to meet that supervisory 
standard in their continued employment of Elmer G. Erickson. 
It is to this allegation that appellant also requests an 
opportunity to present the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The allegations of the Third-Party Complaint of 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, the appellant herein, state 
claims against Golden Stettler, Lynn Toolson, Alma Dittmer, 
H. M. Nielson and Elmer Gibson, the respondents herein, 
based upon a respondeat superior theory, their negligence 
in hiring and continuing to employ their wrongdoing employee, 
and for the failure to supervise the actions of that wrong-
doing employee. If for some reason some technical aspect 
of pleading has not been met causing the pleadings of the 
Third-Party Complaint to be inadequate, we respectfully 
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request that this Court remand this action to the trial 
court so that an amended pleading may be submitted, 
otherwise we respectfully suggest that the decision of the 
lower court be reversed and the matter be remanded to the 
trial court for further discovery and trial. The granting 
of the motion to dismiss of respondents was premature. 
Appellant merely asks for an opportunity to prove that 
which it pleaded, which if proved would state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted under generally accepted 
principles of law as noted herein. 
Respectfully submitted this -1!J!!... day of May, 1978. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH 
// ~-/ . ~/~ // .-l,f 
~!/L1,yi.~t·;1/---..I 
Calvin L. Rarnpt9n / 
By\b~~' 
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